Ocean One Hundred Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v New Forest National Park Authority [2026] EWCA Civ 493 concerns a rare step in planning law: the revocation of a Certificate of Lawfulness of Existing Use or Development (CLEUD). The certificate, granted in 2008, related to use of land in the New Forest National Park as a caravan site.

Although the facts are highly unusual, the judgment addresses practical points that are relevant more widely, both on the limited grounds for revoking a certificate and on the risk of apparent bias where a case officer prepares a report for elected members or another decision-maker.

 

What is a Certificate of Lawfulness?

A Certificate of Lawfulness of Existing Use or Development (CLEUD) confirms that an existing use or development is lawful for planning purposes. In practice, this is often because it has become immune from enforcement due to the passage of time (for example, in Northern Ireland, generally after 5 years of continuous and uninterrupted breach).

A Certificate of Lawfulness of Proposed Use or Development (CLOPUD) confirms that a proposed use or works would be lawful (for example, because planning permission is not required).

Both types of certificate can protect against enforcement action and give comfort to lenders and purchasers about the planning status of a property.

 

Statutory grounds for revocation of a CLEUD

Under section 171(7) of the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011, a CLEUD can only be revoked in very limited circumstances where either:

• a statement was made, or a document used, that was false in a material particular; or

• material information was withheld.

A similar provision applies in England and Wales. There is no right of appeal against a revocation decision, and in some circumstances the underlying conduct may expose a person to criminal liability.

 

Background

Following an enforcement investigation, the New Forest National Park Authority (NPA) granted a CLEUD for a 2.57-hectare site. The certificate described the land as a “caravan” site, except for a small area shown hatched in blue, which was certified only for caravan storage.

It later emerged that the certificate did not accurately reflect the position on the ground. Put simply, the NPA appeared to have issued a certificate on wider terms than had been applied for.

A central question was how that error arose: did the applicant make a material misstatement or withhold material information (so that the statutory test for revocation was met), or was the problem an administrative error by the NPA?

The NPA therefore decided to revoke the certificate.

 

Apparent bias

The legal test for apparent bias is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias (see Porter v Magill).

The High Court identified several features of the case officer’s conduct which, taken together, created an appearance of bias. In summary:

1.         The officer attended a private meeting at an objector’s home without setting clear boundaries on what could be discussed, and without making a proper note afterwards;

2.         He sent updates to those supporting revocation but not to the certificate-holder, including information discussed by the NPA in confidential session (“Part 2”) from which the public was excluded (under sections 100A and 100I of the Local Government Act 1972);

3.         He shared his draft report to the NPA Board with those supporting revocation, but not with the certificate-holder, and amended the draft following their comments;

4.         He provided material to those supporting revocation on a confidential basis;

5.         He inappropriately deleted an important email chain; and

6.         In a sensitive case where he expected judicial review regardless of the outcome, he failed to remain “above the fray”.

The High Court said that, if the case officer had been the decision-maker, it would have found apparent bias.

The Court of Appeal then had to decide whether the NPA Board’s decision was nonetheless “untainted” by the case officer’s conduct.

The judgment contains a detailed analysis of whether the officer’s report was fair, balanced and legally adequate, so that Board members could take an independent view on the key issues. The Court of Appeal concluded that it was not, and the revocation decision was quashed.

The case still offers useful practical lessons for planning authorities considering revocation, and for those who benefit from certificates of lawfulness.

 

Lack of records: a material consideration on revocation

Because many years had passed since the certificate was issued, parts of the original file and supporting material were missing or incomplete. That meant key documents, such as notes of site visits and details of the evidence considered at the time, were no longer available.

The Court of Appeal held that the absence of records, and the significance of what was missing, were material considerations which the Board had to grapple with when deciding whether the statutory test for revocation was met.

On the facts, the Court of Appeal highlighted (among other points) that:

1.     there was ambiguity in how certain questions in the CLEUD application form could be interpreted;

2.     the available evidence did not clearly show whether the widened scope of the certificate resulted from the applicant’s submissions, or from an error by NPA officers; and

3.     the NPA’s enforcement team had investigated the site, but it was unclear whether (and to what extent) that information had been shared with the officers determining the CLEUD application.

In those circumstances, the report to the Board needed to:

1.     set out, in some detail, the different ways the CLEUD application form used at the time could be interpreted;

2.     explain what information was missing, why it mattered, and what could (and could not) safely be inferred; and

3.     make clear that it was uncertain whether information held by the enforcement team had been shared with the team determining the CLEUD application.

 

Missing records do not prevent a decision

However, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that missing information automatically meant there was no evidential basis on which the NPA could decide whether the statutory power to revoke was available.

It confirmed that the NPA could rely on evidence from third parties and on the material that did exist, including drawing reasonable inferences from that material, when reaching its decision.

 

Conclusion

This is an unusual case, but it illustrates several points of wider relevance.

For applicants, the message is straightforward: prepare CLEUD applications carefully, answer questions fully, and include relevant information even if it may not assist your case. Keep a complete record of what you submit.

For planning authorities, ensure that a certificate matches what was applied for. Where an application is unclear, seek clarification and keep a clear audit trail of the evidence considered and the reasoning for the decision.

More generally, the case underlines the importance of retaining CLEUD records for the long term. It also highlights the need for particular care in officer reports: where there are information gaps, decision-makers must be told what is missing and why it matters, so they can take an informed and independent decision.

 

For legal guidance and advice on how this judgement may apply to your business, please contact Maria O’Loan or another member of our Planning and Environment team.

While great care has been taken in the preparation of the content of this article, it does not purport to be a comprehensive statement of the relevant law and full professional advice should be taken before any action is taken in reliance on any item covered.